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Frens Kroeger 
(Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University) 
 
Abstract 
 
This theoretical outline sketches the development, escalation and collapse of trust in 
expert systems, using the recent financial crisis as an example, but aiming at the 
description of broader underlying mechanisms. After reviewing the literature on the 
genesis of system trust, it identifies spirals of system trust which escalate both 
"vertically" (actors placing too much trust in the system) and "horizontally" (wider 
and wider circles of actors placing trust in the system). Both the apparent stability and 
the potential for collapse inherent in these spirals results from the fact that system 
trust is typically more distant, and consequently lacks some of the safeguards present 
in interpersonal trust. Ironically, thus, attempts to eliminate the influence of trust by 
introducing impersonal rule systems may increase rather than reduce the risk it poses 
to systemic stability. 
 
Keywords: system trust; trust in expert systems; confidence; trust and modernity; 
trust crises; financial crises 
 
	  
1. Introduction 
 
Over the past two decades, trust has evolved into a central concern in much of 
organization theory. This is not least because trust has become problematic across a 
wide range of societal sectors. Media coverage and public debate about the loss of 
trust in systems as different as food production and regulation, the activities and 
control of intelligence agencies, or "yet another once-trusted British institution: the 
police" (The Guardian, 2013a, b, c; 2014a, b) chime with ever-new academic findings 
of declining trust in government, business, health systems and regulatory regimes 
(Stevenson & Wolfers, 2011; Armstrong, 2012; Walls et al., 2004; Edelman Trust 
Barometer, 2013, 2015). Possibly the most glaring of these systemic trust failures was 
implicated in the emergence of the 2008 financial crisis (Gillespie & Hurley, 2013; 
Bachmann & Hanappi-Egger, 2014). 
  However, conceptual underpinnings for major trust failures of this kind have 
been slow to develop (Gillespie et al., 2012; Möllering, 2013). More generally, the 
trust in economic and social systems has remained strongly underresearched. 
 The present paper contributes to addressing this important gap. In the form of a 
theoretical outline, it explores the question how trust in expert systems can escalate 
and collapse. Although it focuses on these dynamics in the context of the financial 
system, it is interested not in a historical account of the recent crisis (for this refer, 
e.g., Shiller, 2008; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008), but in the more generalizable 
mechanisms involved in the escalation and collapse of such trust. 
 Why keep the model this general? First, note that the present paper represents no 
more than a brief (and accordingly, rough) outline, seeing that first conceptual steps 
are still wanting before empirical research can build on and examine the validity of 
	  
the sequence hypothesized here. Second, it is hoped that the usefulness of this 
analysis will not be restricted to the financial sector, but may be instructive in regard 
to other sectors and functional spheres of society. Whether they are eventually found 
to exhibit highly similar or vastly different dynamics, the observations presented here 
can serve to establish a "null hypothesis" against which to chart the processes and 
principles of other expert systems. 
 I will return to both of these points in the concluding section. Before that, the 
following sections will define central terms (section 2.1) and briefly review the 
literature on the development of system trust (2.2); and then chart the different steps 
of the sequence put forward in regard to system trust: development towards 
predominance (section 3.1), expansion (3.2), escalation (3.3), and stability as well as 
potential collapse (3.4). 
 Within this sequence I will discuss, and identify as fallacious, two assumptions or 
"illusions" regarding the role of trust. The first is the idea that trust does not matter 
any more in a given sphere such as the financial system. The second, that the 
respective system is unquestionably stable because this is widely taken for granted. 
We could call the first the illusion of "the end of trust", and the second the illusion of 
stability. A common theme between them is an inherent underestimation of, and a 
consequent lack of attention to, trust and its significance to the system. 
 
2. Interpersonal and system trust 
 
2.1 Definitions 
First, the central concepts of interpersonal and system trust require brief definition. 
Particularly for the sake of communicability and connectivity to other research on 
	  
trust, this contribution adopts the definition of trust put forward by Mayer et al. 
(1995) and since adopted by trust researchers across a wide variety of disciplines (see 
Schoorman et al., 2007). Mayer and colleagues define (interpersonal) trust as  
"the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based 
on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the 
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party" (1995: 
712). 
While the argument presented would be compatible with a wide variety of slightly 
differing definitions of trust, note in particular the central elements of voluntary 
vulnerability (Bigley & Pearce, 1998), relating to the future behavior of others, which 
is fundamentally unpredictable due to their freedom of decision (Luhmann, 1979). 
 These elements can apply both to individual trustees and to social or institutional 
systems (what Giddens [1990] called "expert systems"). Even though here, too, trust 
needs to relate to the human behavior which instantiates and reproduces the respective 
system, it ultimately refers to the systemic principles which guide that behavior (also 
see Sydow, 1998; Bachmann, 1998). (To elaborate on one of Giddens's examples 
[1990: 28], even though passengers never meet the engineers who construct, service 
and monitor the planes which they fly in, they have reasons to trust that the respective 
expert systems generate predictability and safety.) 
 Thus, just as in Luhmann's classical definition, in system trust the trustor 
"basically assumes that a system is functioning and places his trust in that function, 
not in people" (1979: 50). 
 
2.2 The genesis of system trust 
	  
While interpersonal trust building has been studied in considerable depth (for an 
overview, see Lewicki et al., 2006), the genesis of system trust has remained strongly 
underresearched. Luhmann (1979), using the example of the monetary system and 
building on Simmel (1990), merely alluded to repeated confirmatory experiences in 
using money, referring chiefly to the fact that serious disappointments or breakdowns 
need to be absent in daily use. System trust relies on a high level of taken-for-
grantedness (Luhmann, 1988).  
 The comparatively few relevant contributions since can be grouped into two 
distinct categories. The majority of contributions examines (1) the facilitation of 
system trust through mechanisms which increase systemic predictability; these 
mechanisms, in turn, can be grouped into (a) social norms; (b) the punishment of 
malfeasance; and (c) the promotion of relevant communication. A second, separate 
theoretical strand is composed of (2) conceptions of a "scaling up" of trust from the 
interpersonal to the institutional and systemic levels. 
 A number of authors have focused on the supportive capability of social norms in 
making the behavior of systems and their representatives more predictable to the 
outsider (see for instance Braithwaite & Levi, 1998: chapters 2-3). Of particular 
importance here are norms relating to the fairness of social and economic exchanges, 
reciprocity, and mutuality (Cook et al., 2009: chapters 1-4). Wicks et al. (2014) add 
that normatively controlled power equilibria are helpful in preserving fairness and 
therefore making the trusted entity more trustworthy. 
 This ties into increased predictability through punishment of malfeasance and the 
discouragement of untrustworthy behaviors. Especially Hardin (2002) has argued that 
institutional design has to encapsulate the self-interest of the officials administrating 
the larger systems. Legal and compliance mechanisms can be institutionalized as trust 
	  
safeguards (Wicks et al., 2014; also see Sztompka, 1999). This includes specialized 
agencies for monitoring and sanctioning breaches of trust, such as regulators (Pixley, 
2004). 
 A number of contributions discuss the structured promotion of communication 
about trust-relevant issues. Some actors, such as credit-rating organizations and 
financial news organizations (Pixley, 2004), specialize in the evaluation and 
dissemination of trust-relevant information. Other communication, while less 
formalized, can be equally consequential. Braithwaite (1998) discusses "communities 
of dialogue", i.e., institutionalized debate about relevant systems in political and 
administrative circles. These and similar debates can be facilitated by "network 
brokers" who keep communication between relevant parties going (Barr et al., 2009; 
McEvily & Zaheer, 2004). Finally, Papakostas (2012) discusses a variety of 
mechanisms which institutionalize "structured skepticism", particularly in the form of 
rules enforced by independent and impartial bureaucracies. 
 In comparison, research has only begun to investigate the "scaling up" of trust 
across levels, i.e., its translation from the interpersonal to the institutional and to the 
system level (Farrell, 2009; Kroeger, 2012). One of the most promising concepts in 
this field is the "facework" of individuals who represent the trustworthiness of 
institutions and expert systems (Giddens, 1990; Kroeger A, forthcoming), drawing 
attention to dynamics of generalization from the interpersonal to the systemic level. 
Equally, it is worth studying how individuals can build helpful institutions (Lyon & 
Porter, 2010). Calls for studying meso-level phenomena related to system trust (e.g., 
Cook et al., 2009: chapters 5-7) are a logical consequence of these developments. 
	  
 The present contribution will suggest an additional mechanism that can lead to 
the rise, but also to the fall of system trust, based on its reflexive nature and the 
resulting group dynamics. 
 Note that in all of the above renditions, system trust is significantly more distant 
than interpersonal trust (also see Harris et al, 2014: chapters 3-4). The trustor's 
experiences clearly lack the immediacy of interpersonal trust building (Khodyakov, 
2007), where the object of trust is easier to observe, and often responds directly to the 
trustor's actions, signalling (un)trustworthiness in a much more immediate and 
continuous fashion. 
 
3. System trust: growth, escalation, collapse 
 
3.1 From interpersonal to system trust 
Giddens (1990) connects interpersonal and system trust in the context of a broad 
historical or "evolutionary" progression. His well-known argument about the 
development towards (late) modernity shows how virtually all sectors of 
contemporary organized social life – from flying in planes over visiting a doctor to 
drinking clean tap water – fundamentally rely on trust in the respective expert 
systems, where in pre-modern or early modern times, trust in the individual medic or 
water-vendor was typically required. 
 The financial sector provides an obvious example for this development. Today, 
financial markets are regarded as essentially technical phenomena, to be anticipated 
and engaged with on the basis of rational calculation and largely technical expertise. 
While this idea has come to be widely taken-for-granted, in the past financial markets 
used to rely heavily on interpersonal trust, as illustrated by Mayer's (2008) study of 
	  
equity markets in the UK, Germany and Japan at the beginning of the 20th century. 
Although each market relied on different intermediaries (local stock brokers in the 
UK, bankers in Germany, and "business coordinators" in Japan), interpersonal trust in 
each of them was fundamental. While each of these groups held different kinds of 
relations with the companies listed at local stock exchanges, it was trust in the 
individual competence, but also the personal integrity and benevolence of these 
professionals which bridged the problems of future uncertainty and imperfect 
information, enabling financiers to confidently invest in the businesses that the trusted 
intermediaries vouched for. Without these central relations of interpersonal trust, the 
functioning of each of these financial markets would have been severely disrupted.1 
 
3.2 The end of trust? 
At the same time, the shift away from a reliance on these and other informal 
interpersonal relationships also links to broader social phenomenona which have been 
analyzed variously as bureaucratization, juridification, or more recently, 
financialization (Merton, 1940; Teubner, 1987; Epstein, 2005; also see Ritzer, 1996), 
and all of which can be traced back to Max Weber's (1968 [1922]) classical analysis 
of the process of rationalization. According to Weber, a central goal of rationalization 
in the move towards modernity is the elimination of informal, individual or 
idiosyncratic factors which may distort the "proper" and rational conduct of business. 
This elimination is achieved by introducing systems of impersonal rules, designed to 
operate sine ira et studio, and without regard of the individual person. 
 This process is highly evident in the financial sector. Here, a whole "science"  has 
formed in order to eliminate the human element, i.e., decisions based on "irrational" 
motivations such as personal indebtedness, competitive spirit, hubris (Bollaert & 
	  
Petit, 2010), or intuition (Hensman & Sadler-Smith, 2011), and a whole range of 
emotions that may accompany them (e.g., anxiety, anger, or pride; Pixley, 2004). 
Instead, aspects of individual decision-making are progressively replaced with 
mathematical modelling which fulfils an increasingly prescriptive function 
(MacKenzie, 2006). In this way, investment decisions are meant to become fully 
rational and a matter of scientific accuracy rather than individual judgement. 
 This includes the intended elimination of the influence of interpersonal trust 
relations as portrayed by Mayer. Trust tends to be viewed as an idiosyncratic and 
essentially irrational phenomenon by economists and financial theorists (classically, 
see Williamson, 1975, 1993). Indeed, the majority of economic and financial theorists 
seem to agree that the introduction of "rational" methods such as mathematical 
modelling has eliminated the issue of trust entirely, ignoring trust in their analysis 
(Noteboom, 2002; Sapienza, 2009). Williamson even explicitly recommends avoiding 
"diffuse" concepts like trust (1996: 261). 
 However, no financial system can exist in the absence of (specific forms of) trust. 
Simmel's (1990 [1900]) now near-universally accepted insight that money depends 
fundamentally on trust in order to be able to function as a symbolic token of material 
value, applies a fortiori to financial markets in which still more abstract forms of 
money circulate (also see Gill & Butler, 1996). This is illustrated impressively by 
breakdowns of whole currencies in the past (see e.g. Fergusson, 2010), but also by the 
more recent instances of "bank runs" on Northern Rock, IndyMac and others (Shin, 
2009; Acharya et al., 2009). 
 Active participation in today's financial markets is predicated not only on the 
reliance on further "guardians of trust" (Shapiro, 1987) such as ratings agencies, but 
also on the use of, acceptance of, and belief in a multitude of key statistics, ratings 
	  
and rankings, risk models, and trend projections (Danielsson, 2008; Mazumder & 
Ahmad, 2010). Use of these types of information would be pointless and illogical 
without a basic belief in the correctness of these models and their underlying 
assumptions.2 That is, the actors involved "basically assume that the system is 
functioning and place their trust in that function, not in people" (see above). 
 Thus, consistent with Giddens's hypothesis, the need for interpersonal trust is 
replaced by a need for system trust instead. The shift from arrangements based on 
individual relations to impersonal systems does not eliminate trust per se, it merely 
shifts predominance from one type to another. However, system trust is less 
conspicuous than interpersonal trust, largely on account of its high degree of taken-
for-grantedness (also see Möllering, 2006), promoting the illusion of the "end of 
trust". If as a result theorists and, more importantly, practitioners within the financial 
system assume that trust has been successfully eliminated, the shift away from 
interpersonal trust may have the ironic consequence that the largely unrecognized 
need for system trust may create more, not less of a risk to the stability of financial 
systems. 
 This risk materializes when system trust escalates.  
 
3.3 Escalating system trust 
Trust can spread between actors. That such a transfer of (interpersonal) trust can 
occur has been widely assumed in the literature, for instance by theories of third-party 
conduits of trust and social network analysis (Burt & Knez, 1996; Josang, 2007). Yet 
this does not mean that trust can be passed on "ready-made". Rather, patterns of 
trusting can be transmitted from one actor to another, who then enriches these "core 
logics" with their own individualized interpretations, justifications, and 
	  
rationalizations. (This process is described in greater depth in Kroeger, 2013.) Thus, 
actors can adopt and adapt patterns which make it quicker and easier to develop trust 
on their basis. 
 Such transmission increases the distance of the individual trustor from the person 
of the trustee (McEvily et al., 2003). When interpretations, justifications and 
rationalizations for system trust are passed on, this further increases the already 
marked distance inherent in system trust (in effect moving it increasingly closer to 
Luhmann's (1988) definition of "hope", in which the actor places confident 
expectations in future events, but has little or no influence over them). It is 
particularly this distance which allows system trust to spiral out of proportion. 
 I use the image of escalating spirals of system trust3 because trust in an expert 
system such as finance can escalate in two different but interrelated dimensions: 
 "Vertically": i.e., the degree of trust can spiral upwards much more quickly than 
would be warranted on the basis of first-hand experience. In the run-up to the recent 
crisis this could be observed, on the one hand, in terms of the ever-higher degree of 
trust that led to the taking of greater and greater risks (Gillespie et al., 2012); and on 
the other, in the ready extension of trust to increasingly more complex financial 
instruments, about which great expert knowledge would have been required but was 
available only to a select few (Criado & Van Rixtel, 2008).  
 This establishes a link to the second dimension of escalation: 
 "Horizontally": i.e., system trust can spread to wider and wider circles of actors 
who are less familiar with the principles and dynamics of the expert system 
(Mazumder & Ahmad, 2010). In the run-up to the recent crisis, this was visible as 
great numbers of actors displayed trust in the financial system, freely investing in 
some of its most complex instruments. After the outbreak of the financial crisis, 
	  
however, they admitted that their knowledge of these instruments and their 
complexities had been very limited (also see Goldin & Vogel, 2010). 
 Consider the example of the German Landesbanken, regional state-owned 
financial institutions of significant size whose board of directors typically include 
government officials. After the outbreak of the financial crisis, many of them pointed 
out that it would have been inconceivable for them to be part of the tiny minority 
resisting the new financial instruments and the profit opportunities they offered. They 
also indicated that they had not possessed the necessary expertise to understand the 
magnitude of the risks they were taking. For instance, after the Bayerische 
Landesbank had incurred losses through high-risk trading of more than € 4 bn in 
2007/08, prime minister and board member Günther Beckstein explained that he and 
his colleagues could not have been reasonably expected to recognize the severe risks 
involved in the transactions they had approved (Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 2010). 
Similarly, Austrian finance minister Josef Pröll, involved in the Bayerische 
Landesbank's costly takeover of Hypo Alpe Adria, indicated in court he had not been 
aware of the risks, relying solely on experts instead (Format, 2013). 
 
3.4 Stability and the potential for collapse 
The result, then, may be escalating spirals of system trust in which actors who know 
increasingly little about the workings of the expert system bestow trust to a greater 
extent, in more respects, relating to higher stakes, and/or more quickly – that is, 
altogether more "blindly" – than would seem warranted, and specifically, more so 
than typically observable in relations of interpersonal trust. In addition, I contend that 
such spirals of system trust, having undergone escalation, are prone to collapse. Why? 
	  
 I want to argue that this is the result of actors having few safeguards at their 
disposal for system trust. Not only are they often far removed from the institutional 
safeguards described in section 2 (e.g., relevant institutionalized debates), which are 
often in themselves complex and difficult to interpret to the actors particularly due to 
the "horizontal" escalation described. What is more, trustors lack important 
safeguards which they can draw on in the case of interpersonal trust. This is 
particularly in two respects, both of which are related to the typically more distant 
experience of expert systems. 
 First, interpersonal trust, where built over time, is experience-based in nature and 
can rely on a continuous stream of interactional cues (Six, 2007; Perks & Halliday, 
2003). The trustee's behavior is taken as indicative of (lacking) trust and 
trustworthiness, particularly where tangible and consequential decisions between 
discrete alternatives need to be made. In addition, in recurring interpersonal 
interaction the trustee can be considered to "give off" signals of their motivations and 
intentions in an involuntary fashion (Goffman, 1959); faking these signals 
convincingly and consistently would often be as costly as factual trustworthiness 
(Bacharach & Gambetta, 2001). Research has demonstrated how actors develop, often 
highly effective, lay theories which help them distinguish trustworthy from 
untrustworthy individuals in the context of their respective life-worlds (famously, see 
Gambetta & Hamill, 2005). 
 Second, interpersonal trust can be bolstered by interpersonal control. A growing 
branch of the trust literature has demonstrated that trust and control are not only 
functional substitutes but also complements (Mellewigt et al., 2007); the same is true 
of trust and power (Bachmann, 2001; also see Luhmann, 1979). Greater power and/or 
control over the trustee's behavior can bring about higher predictability and thereby 
	  
facilitate trust. Trust is not always "blind" (Giddens, 1990) but typically relies to 
varying degrees on monitoring and the potential to influence the trustee's conduct. 
 In contrast, as noted above the experience of expert systems such as finance is 
typically mediated, and often abstract and ambiguous in nature. Corrective signals 
typically occur more rarely and are more difficult to observe and interpret, often to 
everyone save the most accomplished experts within the system. In addition, 
individual control cannot be exerted over such expansive and complex systems. As a 
substitute, trust in these systems is more likely to rely on "illusions of control" which 
establish mere psychological safety (McKnight et al., 1998). 
 Instead, the chief safeguard accessible to the individual and applicable to trust in 
these collective and somewhat distant expert systems is anchored in the reflexive 
nature of system trust, i.e., in the observation that others trust (Luhmann, 1979). It is  
"what Cialdini (1993) has termed social proof that a particular interpretation of 
reality is correct. Thus, by observing others acting in a trusting manner, 
individuals can infer that such a stance is neither foolish nor naive" (Meyerson et 
al., 1996: 186; also cf. Sabel, 1993).  
 Consequently, trustors will look to others for confirmation and inspiration. This 
group orientation facilitates the transfer of interpretations, rationalizations, and 
justifications for trust, and forms the trust equivalent of the "herd mentality" which 
has repeatedly been diagnosed as responsible for the run on risky financial products 
preceding the recent financial crisis (e.g., Gounaris & Prout, 2009; Brunnermeier et 
al., 2009). Consistent with Shapiro's (1987) ideas, this encompassed some of the most 
important "guardians of trust" (such as insurers, independent analysts, and others) 
whose task it would have been to institutionalize distrust and to act as external 
safeguards. 
	  
 Reliance on "social proof" as a safeguard is thus liable to create an "illusion of 
stability" (which, in its turn, is closely related to the classical assumption of efficient 
markets; also see Holland, 1985). System trust can appear highly stable and, 
ironically, the appearance of stability is likely to be the greater the further escalation 
has proceeded, as more actors are seen to exhibit higher levels of trust. 
 (To return to the example of the Bayerische Landesbank, Günther Beckstein later 
explained that the chief reason why excessive risks were not recognized was because 
"maybe, to a degree, everyone was relying on one another"; Deutschlandradio Kultur, 
2014.) 
 At the same time, the lack of alternative safeguards makes existing spirals of 
system trust highly vulnerable. They are likely to remain stable only while retaining a 
high level of taken-for-grantedness in the eyes of actors. Once the basis of trust comes 
under question, there is little to stop doubt from spreading catastrophically. In 
interpersonal trust, direct and personally tailored action can be taken to prevent an 
escalation of doubt (Grover et al., 2014). Alternatively, the mode of coordination can 
often be switched from interpersonal trust to interpersonal control (Mellewigt et al., 
2007; Bachmann, 2001). Neither of these is possible for the broad and overarching 
expert systems (also see Shapiro, 1987). Hence, the dynamics of "social proof" mean 
that not only the growth, but the loss of system trust, too, can be highly contagious. 
Once initiated, the breakdown of these spirals can be as self-reinforcing as their 
preceding expansion. 
 Thus, to return to our guiding image, the escalating spirals of system trust are 
balanced on a fine tip; once the underlying basis of system trust is shaken, they can 
collapse quickly and cataclysmically. The insight that a loss of trust typically comes 
	  
about in a more sudden or "catastrophic" fashion than its emergence (Burt & Knez 
1996: 83) applies a fortiori to system trust. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
4.1 Synopsis 
The argument made in this theoretical outline can be summed up in terms of an ideal-
typical sequence, which incorporates two fallacious assumptions or "illusions", and is 
likely to result in an ironical outcome. 
 This sequence is the escalation of system trust, both "vertically" (in terms of its 
intensity) and "horizontally" (in terms of ever-wider circles of actors included), 
resulting in escalating spirals that are balanced on a fine tip, and become prone to 
collapse as soon as their heretofore taken-for-granted basis comes under question to 
any meaningful degree. This is the result of characteristics which distinguish system 
trust from interpersonal trust, particularly its more distant and less immediate nature, 
and the fact that as a consequence it lacks a number of safeguards which are pertinent 
to the interpersonal form. 
 The fallacious assumptions implicated in this process are, first, what I have called 
the illusion of the "end of trust", i.e., the assumption that the significance of all trust is 
eliminated through the introduction of impersonal systems, when really, this merely 
shifts significance from interpersonal to system trust (but participants typically are 
less aware of the need for or the consequences of system trust). And, second, what we 
may call the "illusion of stability", viz., that participants to the system may be the 
most confident of its stability when it has reached its most unstable point – both of 
	  
these on account of ever-increasing numbers of actors exhibiting taken-for-granted 
trust in the system. 
 Thus, ironically, the intended antidote may itself become the poison: the 
measures taken to eliminate the perceived risk posed by trust may instead increase it, 
as trust becomes less visible; and the system may appear the most stable when trust in 
it has reached its most precarious escalation, making collapse more likely. 
 
4.2 Limitations and implications 
Needless to say, this contribution suffers from a great number of shortcomings, not 
least due to its nature as a brief and highly generalized theoretical outline. However, it 
also opens up a number of fruitful avenues of enquiry. Questions that result from this 
conceptual outline include: 
 How is system trust built? As mentioned, the genesis of system trust has 
remained strongly underresearched. In particular, more attention is due to an 
elaboration and extension of the few existing multi- and cross-level concepts which 
have been applied to trust, such as "facework" (Giddens, 1990). 
 What are channels or "vectors for trust" (Besson et al., 2008) through which 
system trust is diffused among actors and organizations? For instance, what is the 
trust discourse in relevant inter-organizational networks and industry associations? 
Are there important "faceworkers" or "trust brokers" (Della Giusta, 2008) here, too, 
who are particularly relevant for extending and spreading system trust within expert 
systems? 
 A great number of fruitful empirical questions could build on the foundation 
sketched here. For instance, staying with the example of the financial system, in the 
multiple areas of investment banking: How do market-makers come to trust the 
	  
ratings and the models used for these ratings by rating agencies? Is this trust passed 
on through their advisory relationships with other organizations? What is the role of 
regulators in this context? 
 In particular, the greatest shortcoming of the analysis sketched here – i.e., its 
highly general nature – is intended to be simultaneously its greatest strength: are there 
other social and economic subsystems that this sequence can be applied to? Where 
else can system trust escalate, with the potential danger of collapse, as a result of 
systems introduced to rationalize and eliminate the role of interpersonal trust? A 
number of societal sectors spring to mind where decision-making based on 
interpersonal experience is increasingly crowded out by rule-based bureaucratic 
systems, such as medicine, education, or social work. What are other paths towards a 
collapse of system trust in different sectors? Can we create a "catalogue" of different 
mechanisms creating this risk? 
 Lastly, from a more practical or advisory angle: what can be done to prevent 
cataclysmic breakdowns of system trust, such as the one underlying the recent 
financial crisis, from reoccurring? Giddens sketched the development from 
interpersonal to system trust as a dominant development in late modernity. 
Considering the contemporary crisis of trust in expert systems, what are likely future 
developments and solutions? Are there ways of making system trust once more a 
more active achievement? For instance, is there an argument for exploring ways of re-
integrating interpersonal trust relations into rationalized modern institutions? 
 Obviously, much still remains to be done. However, it is hoped that the present 
outline can make a meaningful contribution and provide a fruitful basis for further 
investigation of this important phenomenon. 
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1 Carruthers (2009), too, describes this historical transformation in borrowing and 
lending in the Anglo-American world. Interpersonal trust still plays a central role in 
many societies with less extensive or less complex systems of financial trading (see, 
e.g., Lyon & Porter, 2010). The arguments presented refer to highly differentiated 
"Western" financial systems. 
2 For one fundamental example see the assumption that descriptive statistics of the 
recent past are accurate proxies for predicting the immediate future. Behavioral 
finance has started to convincingly disprove this premise for a range of financial 
contexts (Baker & Nofsinger, 2010). 
3 While I use the same image of escalating spirals as Shapiro's (1987) classic 
contribution on the escalation of trust, note that the present argument differs 
fundamentally from her observation that bestowing impersonal trust leads to a need 
for trust in further agents (or "guardians of trust"). (E.g., taking out an insurance 
against an abuse of trust requires trust in the insurance company.) Where her 
argument is concerned with the institutionalization of distrust and a consequent 
escalation of the circle of trustees, the present argument focuses on the spread of 
(patterns or logics of) trusting and ever-expanding circles of trustors. 
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